Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research 99/397

154

ARMY HISTORICAL RESEARCH

presented itself in Loyalist enclaves, ‘a few months would restore this country to its former good Government’. 8 Whilst it has been noted that there were more Loyalists in North Carolina than anywhere else, the stark reality remains that there was not a majority of Loyalist support in North Carolina or generally in the South. 9 A study of the battles and skirmishes in the South from 1778 onwards indicates that generally more American forces were present than Loyalist forces, even when there were British Regulars to support them. In 1779, ‘the British occupation of Augusta (Georgia) failed to inspire confidence on the part of local Tories of whom no more than a few hundred ever formed into actual Militia units. In fact, more backcountry residents, about two or three times as many, actually took up arms against the British than were raised’. 10 This miscalculation of loyal support was not the only problem within British thinking, which, on at least six counts, fundamentally misunderstood American socio-cultural dynamics, its politics, and the unique changes that were taking place within it, which contributed to the stratified and nuanced layers of support for or rejection of one of the warring factions. 11 Firstly, the European ‘war of posts’ being practised in the South, which ‘emphasized offensive action aimed at bringing enemy field armies to decisive battle, and used large networks or field fortifications to pacify territory’, was wholly unsuited to conditions in America. 12 Whilst this model had worked and would continue to work on the European continent, American commanders such as General William L. Davidson recognised the maddening paradox afflicting British operations in the Carolina backcountry. Simply stated, with so few troops and little loyal military support, they could not garrison every locality. If they sought to control the towns, they left the country and routes in between open to the American Militia and the reforming Continental Army. If they dispersed their forces and occupied the country, then their army could be destroyed in detail. 13 The second major problem Cornwallis faced was a political one. General Clinton’s proclamation of 3 June 1780, which revoked paroles and replaced them with oaths of allegiance was a serious political miscalculation that became a major military problem. The proclamation, ‘too lenient for diehards, pushed former rebels to choose between a pretence of loyalism and rebellion’. 14 It almost 18 James Simpson to Sir Henry Clinton, 15 May 1780, in A.S. Brown (ed.), ‘James Simpson’s Reports on the Carolina Loyalists, 1779-1780’, The Journal of Southern History, vol. 21, no. 4 (1955), p. 519. 19 R.O. DeMond, The Loyalists in North Carolina During the Revolution (Durham: Duke University Press, 1940), p. vii. 10 Wilson, Southern Strategy, p. 86. 11 Shy, A People Numerous and Armed , pp. 122-125. 12 C. Heaton, ‘The Failure of Enlightenment Military Doctrine in Revolutionary America: The Piedmont Campaign and the Fate of the British Army in the Lower South’, The North Carolina Historical Review, vol. 87, no. 2, (April 2010), p. 128. 13 Davidson to Martin, 27 Nov. 1780, W. Clark, ed., The Colonial and State Records of North Carolina (Raleigh: P. M. Hale, 1886) hereinafter CSRNC , vol. XIV, pp. 759-760. 14 Shy, A People Numerous and Armed, p. 299 .