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had broken their paroles by joining the American Militia. Wemyss wrote that for nearly a month he had ‘done everything in [his] power to get at’ Marion but he had failed although he had burned 50 houses belonging to those who had broken their paroles. 22 On receiving his letter, Cornwallis immediately recalled Wemyss and his men to Camden. 23 With few Regulars and relatively few Loyalist Militia, these counter-productive tactics were never going to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the neutrally-minded, much less convert strident Americans to re-accept British political authority. By late Summer 1780, it had become clear that British policies were not having the intended effect. Not surprisingly, the requirements of the British oath of allegiance had precisely the opposite effect to that intended, as they caused enlistments to the American Militia to soar. This reaction might have been anticipated as almost identical oaths in North Carolina, required since 1777, had caused no widespread rise in the enlistment of Loyalist Militia. 24 Similarly, the arrival of British regiments in the Carolinas witnessed no significant increase in Loyalist enlistments, whereas the presence of the Continental Army in those areas was almost always accompanied by large influxes to the local American Militia. Predictions of Loyalists flocking to the British colours proved unrealistic in both states. A third major problem occurred on 5 June 1780, when General Clinton departed from Charles Town with over 4,500 British and German soldiers. 25 With them went any realistic chance of securing and holding the former southern colonies without massive Loyalist military support. Cornwallis seemed aware of the dearth of troops almost immediately upon taking command. Less than a month after Clinton embarked for New York, he began his regular, repeated requests for diversionary forces in the Chesapeake. 26 By October, he wanted diversions not in Virginia but North Carolina. 27 After five years of war, the British Army was running out of soldiers to fill the ranks. Although British Regulars (and some Provincials) were nearly unbeatable when engaged in battle on equal terms, they were certainly not immortal. 28 In the American colonies, some 19,000 men were lost by death, desertion, discharge, or capture. 29 Piers Mackesy noted the 22 Wemyss to Cornwallis, 20 Sept. 1780, Cornwallis Papers , II, p. 215. 23 Cornwallis to Wemyss, 26 Sept. 1780, Cornwallis Papers , II, p. 216. 24 DeMond, Loyalists in North Carolina , pp. 156-157. 25 C.T. Atkinson, ‘British Forces in North America: Their Distribution and Strength’, Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research , vol. XVI, no. 61, (Spring 1937), pp. 20-21. 26 Cornwallis to Clinton, 30 June 1780, The Campaign in Virginia , I, pp. 29-30. 27 Rawdon to Leslie, 24 Oct. 1780, Cornwallis Papers, II, pp. 56-57. Rawdon to Clinton, 28 Oct. 1780, Cornwallis Papers, II, p. 59. 28 General James Murray paraphrased in M.H. Spring, With Zeal and with Bayonets Only: The British Army on Campaign in North America, 1775-1783 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2008), p. 30. 29 Spring, With Zeal and with Bayonets Only, p. 28.