Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research 99/397

CORNWALLIS ’ S INVASION OF NORTH CAROLINA , 1780

159

with General Gates, 210 kilometres northwards in Hillsborough. Amongst Gates’s men, none were North Carolina Continentals, because 800 of them had become prisoners when Charles Town surrendered in May 1780 . 45 Although the American Militia’s performance was often less than effective, it performed a critical, though seldom realised, role in the war in that the men served as an ‘armed local constabulary, enforcing laws, and maintaining order’. 46 Wherever there was no British presence, the American Militia suppressed Loyalist activity, using confiscatory powers and terror where deemed necessary. 47 Whether through volunteering, being a substitute, or being drafted, by war’s end, a substantial proportion of the American male population had served six months or more in this ‘peculiar institution’. 48 The Militia ensured that between 1776 and 1780, Loyalist uprisings in North Carolina were only sporadic, being efficiently suppressed by the state’s political and military leadership. 49 Militarily, the American Militia did not win every battle or skirmish against Loyalists, but they won most of them. From July to October 1780 there were 22 engagements across South Carolina involving American Militia, 17 of them in the Carolina backcountry, forcing British commanders to react and send Regulars to quell the isolated rebellions . 50 After the disastrous Battles of Camden and Fishing Creek in mid-August 1780, Major William Richardson Davie’s North Carolina State Cavalry was ‘the only corps in service yet unbroken’. 51 During the six months he was on the front lines as a cavalry officer, he became very much a master of la petite le guerre, using Light Cavalry to harass and generally create havoc for British forces. 52 It is hard to refute that during the invasion, Davie was every bit as effective a cavalry commander as his direct counterpart, Tarleton. 53 As desirous as Cornwallis was to strike a blow at the American Militia around Charlotte, Davie and other American Militia commanders (many of them former Continental officers) were successful in avoiding a surprise attack by the Legion, which had, in previous engagements like Fishing Creek and Monck’s Corner, severely disrupted the American units involved. Where Loyalist Militia was raised, identifying proper leadership, retaining those who joined up and getting them to fight constituted a seventh major problem. British officers expended enormous amounts of time, effort, and

45 Rankin, The North Carolina Continentals , p. 248. 46 Spring, With Zeal and with Bayonets Only, p. 16. 47 Ibid.

48 Shy, A People Numerous and Armed, p. 249. 49 DeMond, Loyalists in North Carolina , p. 106. 50 W.E. Edgar, Partisans and Redcoats: The Southern Conflict That Turned the Tide of the American Revolution (New York: Harper Collins, 2001), p. 89. 51 W.A. Graham (ed.), General Joseph Graham and his Papers on North Carolina Revolutionary War History (Raleigh: Edwards & Broughton, 1904), p. 246. 52 Carpenter, Southern Gambit , location 200. 53 B.P. Robinson, William R. Davie (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1957), pp. 30-35.