Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research 99/397

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ARMY HISTORICAL RESEARCH

iii) prepare to breach the minefields in one night sufficiently to allow the armour to break out of the bridgehead by first light. Major Peter Moore RE was directed by Kisch to study all the reports from Divisions, and then to set up the ‘School of Mine Clearance’. This was based at Burg el Arab with Major A.R. Currie RE as Chief Instructor. The school’s purpose was to: a) conduct experiments to determine the best method of mine clearance. b) evolve a simple, automatic, and fool-proof drill for the detection and clearance of mines. c) incorporate into the procedures the use of metal detectors, including the new Polish Mine Detector Mk I. d) Assess whether probing with bayonets was an effective and realistically practicable methodology for detecting mines. e) assess other mechanical methods. f) Consider the best way to counter German deployment of the box or Shu mine – an anti-personnel mine consisting of a wooden box filled with explosive. The only metal component, usually concealed beneath the charge was the detonator. This made it extremely difficult to detect. g) provide instruction in the use of the Scorpion, a mine-exploding flail mounted on the front of the Matilda tank. The Engineers of the various Divisions provided differing experiences acquired from actual operations in July and again in September. 21 As a result of lessons learned in these actions, Lieutenant-Colonel F.M.H. Hanson, the CRE of 2nd New Zealand Division, suggested that a Gapping Party should consist of one NCO and eight men with one detector, and that such a party could clear a 4-yard wide gap suitable for infantry through a 400-yard-deep field in about 30 minutes in daylight. He estimated that to clear a 40-yard gap suitable for armour/tanks of similar depth at night would require 12 such mine Gapping Parties . 22 The School did invaluable work during the occupation of the El Alamein position but was closed on the opening of the final offensive in November 1942. In view of the experience gained in the advance following the breakout, and with the arrival of reinforcements lacking training and experience in this form of warfare, it was re-opened first at Benghazi and then at Tripoli. 21 The operations prior to the main battle were – Operation ‘Bacon’ on 14 th at July at Tel el Eisa and the Ruweist Ridge – a battle of three days’ duration; Operation ‘Manhood’ was a plan to break the Axis line south of the Miteirya Ridge – then to exploit to the northwest – South African Engineers were required to gap the minefield to the SE of the Ridge by midnight on 26 th July, and on 1 st September, the 2/15 th Australian Infantry participated in Operation ‘Bulimba’, which was designed to test tactics and strategies for the upcoming battle. The fighting was vicious, and the battalion suffered 183 casualties. 22 National Archives of New Zealand, CRE 2nd NZ Division to CE 13 Corps, 12 th August 1942 — WAII/1DA37/1/36.