Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research 99/397

MINE CLEARANCE AT EL ALAMEIN , 1942

207

of the new Scorpion mine destroyers, which became an essential element for the 8th Army’s Operation Lightfoot. Major Reid of the New Zealand Engineers who is reported to have said: … This idea had great possibilities, especially from the Sappers’ point of view, as if we could get tanks to clear gaps through minefields, we could anticipate a much longer life … . 32 Compared to the other available alternatives such as rollers and hand-clearance, the flail-type mine clearance system appeared to be far superior. 33 Although the mine sweeping process was slow, the Scorpions raised such a huge cloud of dust when used in the desert that they obscured themselves from German gunners. The cloud also blinded the drivers and the crews had to resort to wearing their gas masks in order to breathe. Dust in the desert under normal conditions is bad enough, but the dust storm caused by the Scorpion in action, apart from the advantage of providing complete invisibility, had the disadvantage of penetrating every part of any mechanism, leading to clogging and excessive wear. The original Scorpions were manned by Royal Armoured Corps personnel, with a Sapper in the armoured sponson operating the flail mechanism . 34 During the battle, the Scorpions were less successful than hoped because, whilst reasonably effective at mine clearing, the hastily-developed flail system was unreliable and broke down frequently. This was due to engine failures as the air filters were overwhelmed by the volume of dust. Much of the mine clearing that was critical to the Commonwealth victory still had to be carried out by hand. However, one unexpected effect was that the noise, dust and terrifying appearance of an approaching flail tank caused several Axis infantry units to surrender without resistance. In combat, the usual tactic was to use Scorpions in groups of five. Three would go forward in echelon formation, clearing a broad path through the minefield. The other two would hang back on the flanks and give fire support but were ready to move forward to replace one of the flailing tanks if it was disabled. There were disadvantages; flailing did not remove all mines and a Teller mine buried up to 5-inches deep would destroy a single flail chain, which would have to be replaced at some point. The 8th Army’s experience of mine-clearing operations, particularly in July, was not very encouraging. In each of the Divisions, all Engineers were under the 32 J.F. Cody, The Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War, 1939-1945 – New Zealand Engineers in the Middle East (Wellington: Dept. of Internal Affairs – War History Branch, 1961), p. 345. 33 Night Vision and Electronic Sensors Directorate AMSRD-CER-NV-TR-220A , Breaching the “Devil’s Garden”, Operation Lightfoot, The Second Battle of El Alamein, 23 October 1942 (Fort Belvoir, VA, 2006). Lt William Schneck’s report appears in the appendices of this work – See Appendix L Annexes 1 & 2. 34 Pakenham-Walsh, p. 371.