Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research 99/397

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ARMY HISTORICAL RESEARCH

CHARLES E. CALLWELL AND THE BRITISH WAY IN WARFARE, by Daniel Whittingham. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020. ISBN: 9781108480079, pp. 286, £75.00 This book is an authoritative biography of Major-General Sir Charles Edward Callwell; late-Victorian British Army officer, strategic theorist, and the author of ninety-three books and articles on various military topics surrounding British warfare. Beyond his literary accomplishments, Callwell saw action during the South African War of 1899–1902 and held the important post of Director of Military Operations in the War Office during the First World War. Daniel Whittingham’s book will be of great value to those with an interest in the South African campaign or the First World War, but its principal strength lies in its discussion of Callwell as a strategic thinker of late-nineteenth and early twentieth-century warfare. Throughout, Whittingham articulates the complexity of his subject. He notes that Callwell enjoyed sports, and that participating in games and competitive activities were an influential component of his character. He also addresses the somewhat uncivilized vocabulary used by Callwell to describe the different indigenous peoples encountered by the British Army across the Empire. Whittingham describes a man who was a product of his time— imperfect, but important as a historical figure. The author devotes an entire chapter to Callwell’s influential book Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice , and to the topic of counter-insurgency and its roots in colonial warfare. He addresses the colonial aspects of British military action from Callwell’s point of view, and overlays this with the history and context that drove Callwell to the tactical and strategic analogies that were compiled within Small Wars —the first real synthesis of the British Army’s experiences of colonial warfare. Whittingham notes that Callwell was not a ‘theorist of counter- insurgency’ (p. 40), rather he was ‘more concerned with the mechanics of conquest’ (p. 11). For those wishing to gain a greater understanding of Callwell’s best-known work, they will not be disappointed by Whittingham’s expert commentary. Yet they will also learn much of value about one of Callwell’s less remembered texts. In Military Operations and Maritime Preponderances: Their relations and Interdependence , Callwell argued for the merits of a small but efficient amphibious striking force. In doing so, he inspired discussion into the mechanics of harmonising land power and maritime strategy. By bringing Military Operations and Maritime Preponderances back into public focus, Whittingham will encourage current and future military strategists to revisit Callwell’s amphibious, joint warfare theories. The biography covers both of the periods Callwell spent at the War Office: first in 1907 as an intelligence officer; second, from 1914, as the Director of Military Operations. He records Callwell’s influence over the development of intelligence within the War Office, and his attitude towards the Gallipoli campaign of 1915. Whittingham states that Callwell had no designs for an operation in the Dardanelles, and that he was a firm believer that victory in the First World War