Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research 99/397

THE BATTLE OF CHALGROVE , 1643

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The strength of Essex’s army varied considerably from period to period. At Edgehill it had been approximately 15,000 strong but had dwindled to not much more than 5,000 over the winter of 1642-43 before increasing again to 19,000 during his advance on Reading in April 1643. It is suggested that its strength fell by a third after the capture of Reading on 27th April 1643 through dispersion to other duties. This decline in strength was continuing at the time of Chalgrove with the casualties suffered there adding to the process of reduction. Many officers would have had few men to command. By July 1643, losses from casualties, prisoners and disease had reduced his forces to around 2,500 Horse and 3,000 Foot fit for duty. 15 The pay convoy from London arrived in Thame very early on the morning of 18th June 1643 as indicated by the various pay warrants issued that day. 16 When the alarm came from Chinnor, Essex’s principal officers were in Thame waiting for their regiments’ money. When the magnitude of the attack became known, it was judged impractical to send messages to the cavalry regiments in the outlying villages to rally towards the scene of action because that would have taken too long. The principal officers, with whatever escorts they had to guard the money they were intending to collect, appear to have been ordered to intercept the Royalists. It is generally accepted that this initial-response group consisted of between 700 and 800 men. In addition to these, and probably before this counter- attack force could be gathered together, the commander of Essex’s Horse, Sir Philip Stapleton, who had the night watch, had sent out two officers – Captains Mount Sanders and Anthony Buller – with about 100 ‘commanded’ mounted men, to gain intelligence of what had happened at Chinnor and to discover the direction of Rupert’s march. Buller had a troop in Colonel Hans Behre’s regiment of Horse while Sanders was in the Earl of Rochford’s Foot. Some of these ‘commanded’ men were sent back to Stapleton to report while the remainder followed Rupert. Stapleton also sent Captain George Dundas’ troop from James Wardlawe’s Dragoons directly towards Chiselhampton to try and cut off the Royalists: as Wheatley bridge was held by Parliamentarian forces, Chiselhampton was the only place that Rupert could cross the River Thame. Sanders and Buller moved on from Chinnor and joined forces with Gunter, Crosse and Sheffield at around 0800. The latter having first encountered Rupert close to Aston Rowant, began skirmishing with the Royalists at about 0815 at South Weston, a mile and half beyond, trying to slow them in the hope of reinforcements arriving from Thame. The Parliamentarians, approximately 250 strong, were attacked by Percy’s regiment and Rupert’s, the latter under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel O’Neale. Letters relates that these – together some 600 men – caused the Parliamentarians to be so ‘overborne with multitude,

15 Ian Gentles, The English Revolution and the Wars in the Three Kingdoms, 1638-52 (Harlow: Pearson Longman, 2007), pp. 99-100. 16 Pay warrants relating to the date of the convoy’s arrival are in TNA, SP28/7, f.395; SP28/7 f.440; SP28/143, unfol. They show that pay was issued on 18 June 1643.