Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research 99/397

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ARMY HISTORICAL RESEARCH

they broke and fled’. Having scattered the opposition, the Royalist troopers then galloped off to catch up with their Foot. This skirmish is often confused with the action at Chalgrove itself and is described erroneously in Letters as the main battle. Dundas’ troop of Wardlawe’s Dragoons probably heard the pistol shots from the skirmish and was shortly afterwards joined by Gunter’s men in their withdrawal. Dundas may have seen the Royalist infantry passing through Clare crossroads and their cavalry hurrying to join them. He greeted Gunter with the news that reinforcements were on their way from Thame. Sometime around 0730, Colonel John Hampden with Sir Samuel Luke, the Scoutmaster General, and Colonel John Dalbier, Essex’s Quartermaster General of Horse, had probably already left Thame en route to Watlington. Hampden had collected his own Greencoat regiment’s pay at an early stage – at around 0600 and before the alarm came from Chinnor. The group would probably have reached the farmstead of Wheatfield by 0815. On hearing the gunfire and making their way to Stokefield they encountered Gunter’s men. Hampden, as Essex’s second-in- command could have taken command, but recognising his own limitations as a cavalry commander and as related in Letters , he put himself in Crosse’s troop. 17 The 700-800 men also arrived from Thame, but it is not clear from the sources who was in command of this force, as it seems that it was not initially with Hampden and his colleagues. The action at Chalgrove commenced at about 0845 – The Late Beating Up suggests about 0900 – with approximately 1,060 Parliamentarians present. Stapleton did not arrive on Golder Hill with further reinforcements until sometime after 1000, in time only to meet the Parliamentarians fleeing the field. The Royalists’ infantry vanguard was nearly a mile ahead of their cavalry, well on the way to Chiselhampton bridge passing through Easington and following the ancient track from South Weston onwards down Golder Hill. The dragoons with them would have formed the rearguard and ensured the safe withdrawal of the force by lining the hedges and waiting to ambush any pursuers. At stages, as the Foot withdrew, the dragoons would have redeployed back along the road waiting for their own Horse to join them or for any Parliamentarian troops who were pursuing them. Having initially drawn up his cavalry in Solinger field facing Golder Hill, ( See Map 2) Rupert ordered his troopers from line into column and left the cornfield to follow in his infantry’s footsteps, his right flank covered by the Great Hedge. 18 The ancient track bends away from the Great Hedge at the end of Solinger field to avoid marshy land. Rupert must have crossed Warpsgrove Lane into Upper Marsh Lane, 400 yards south from where the lane passes through the Great Hedge, which was a formidable and continuous barrier with few gaps. The lane from Chalgrove up to Warpsgrove House was one such gap and was 1,000 yards away from where the Parliamentarians, who had come down Golder Hill, were

17 BL, E.55 (19). 18 ‘Late Beating Up’, pp. 6-7.