Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research 99/397
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ARMY HISTORICAL RESEARCH
When a ‘S’ mine was activated by a foot treading on the projecting prongs, there were two distinct explosions – the first flung the mine up into the air, whilst the second at about waist height spewed out hundreds of ball bearings horizontally. The after effect of those was devastating. For Alamein, we were rehearsed in mine clearing with and without infantry co-operation, in addition to the course at the Eighth Army school. The Sapper Recce Party went in with the infantry, I felt sorry for the infantry boys who had to walk across the minefield and take up defensive positions to keep the Jerrys off while our lads got to work. Behind the recce group were the tape men who ran out the tape for the eight feet wide gap. Then came the detector party of three sweepers who worked in staggered formation. Each operator had a mate, a marker who fixed a white painted metal cone over any mine that was detected in the gap. Behind the sweepers came the three-man lifting team, who knelt down on the desert and felt around the mine to make sure that it was a ‘clean’ one — that is, that it didn’t have trip wires running from it or a booby-trap attached to it. That really was a dodgy operation – because Jerry also had an explosive device that might be fitted under the fuse in the body of the mine. The rottenest job, I think, was the actual lifting, because of the booby-traps that might be fitted or other cunning anti-handling devices. In day-light one could often see the thin wires that led to another mine nearby, but at night one worked by feel, and a false move – one tug without being sure — and it was all over. Once the mine had been defused, it was lifted out of the ground and placed outside the marking tape. The gap markers ran out their tapes to keep pace with the lifters, pegging down the tapes into position. Working at top speed, a team could work a two-hundred-yard strip in about an hour. The length of time taken was increased if we were under heavy shell fire; longer still if we were under Spandau fire; and even longer if we had casualties. Everybody moved dead slow then. There was always a little group of reserves, just in case we lost men on mines or to shell or machine-gun fire. This group, only a couple of men, stayed at the gap at the edge of the field and they used to brew up for us. It was really thirsty work in a gapping operation; it was fear I should think that made us so thirsty. Because of the strain, we worked in half-hour shifts. Any longer than that and we lost our concentration and became careless. We did the Alamein gapping at night and put out lights to show the routes forward. 36
36 Lucas, pp. 115 – 120.
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