Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research 99/397

MINE CLEARANCE AT EL ALAMEIN , 1942

211

All of the proposed gaps to be made by the 8th Army were given names, some being months of the year and the existence of the ‘scattered minefield’ ‘January’ in front of the 7th Armoured Division complicated matters. The procedure was that the advanced guards were led by a pilot vehicle, with a Scorpion and an RE mine-clearing party immediately behind. As soon as the pilot vehicle struck a mine it would be assumed that the edge of the Axis mined area had been reached and the gapping drill would commence. This would consist of the Scorpion flailing and Sappers with detectors widening and marking the cleared lane. For each of the two lanes there would be a duplicate party and a Scorpion in the rear, for leap-frogging, replacements or extra gaps. The advance would be led by a party of Sappers on foot who would spot mines by eye on a 12-foot front, and in avoiding them, find a safe, though probably not straight, way through the scattered mine belt. Immediately behind them the trail was to be blazed by three ‘snail’ lorries with infantry protection. 37 They had been specially fitted with tanks over the rear wheels from which diesel oil flowed through drip-feeds on to the tyre tracks. Diesel oil leaves an unmistakable mark on the desert; it can be seen even on a moonless night by a man driving a truck. These trucks, besides marking the safe lane would also ‘prove’ it; for when driven in echelon, their tyres covered the width of the lane. These trucks also carried the gap-marking stores. The drivers’ cab floors were well sandbagged. Along the oiled path made by the snails would come the minefield gapping party and the carriers of the assaulting battalion. As soon as a gap had been made, the infantry, headed by their Bren-gun Carrier Platoon, would pass through the gap and form a bridgehead. Casualties The clearance of passages through the enemy mine defences became, therefore, a tremendous task, which occupied by far the largest amount of Engineer effort. This was the case to such an extent that some units became continuously engaged in mine detection and clearance, and casualties began to rise from sheer weariness and nerve strain. Carelessness or lack of caution on the part of the personnel, became commonplace. As a result, the Chief Engineer 8th Army had to make representations that the units concerned should be given more frequent reliefs and changes of employment. The extent and nature of the operation, in which some 44 British, Commonwealth and Allied Engineer units with a working manpower of about 150 personnel each were involved, had led to an estimate of the possible casualties being about 20 per unit or about 13%. The success of the operation, with comparatively light casualties, can be attributed to the excellence of the mine- lifting drill and the accuracy with which it was carried out. The 8th Army in total comprised about 195,000 personnel of which over the 15-day period of 23rd October – 7th November 1942, 2,350 were killed, 8,950 wounded with a further

37 These were twin-tyred 30-cwt. trucks of the Divisional Field Park Company.