Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research 99/397

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chapter, which examines the system of British military education, the social backgrounds of officers, and the regimental affiliations that structured the inter- war army’s interactions and culture. Colvin highlights the social exclusivity of regiments such as the Foot Guards, the Rifle Brigade, and the Cavalry, the almost nonchalant attitude to the serious business of soldiering, and the suspicion of hardworking ‘brass hats’ such as could be found at the Staff College. This amateur attitude, he argues, contrasted poorly with the marked professionalism of the Reichswehr, which despite an even greater degree of social exclusivity among the officer corps, nevertheless viewed soldiering with a seriousness that put to shame the relaxed, club-focused demeanour of many in Britain’s ‘imperial gendarmerie’. Such a divergence in outlook, Colvin suggests, served to influence both armies’ development of doctrine and equipment, which he expounds on in terms of the evolution of common doctrinal concepts by the Reichswehr , in particular regarding the use of armour. The British were chronically unable—whether due to retrenchment, institutional inertia, or internal infighting—to develop a common doctrine, particularly in the field of armour, where growing rifts between orthodox commanders and radical theorists thoroughly handicapped the articulation of practical principles for the employment of tanks in the field. These galling institutional inadequacies are then brought out in full by the author in the following chapters of his work. These detail the changing fortunes of British command in the desert between 1940 and 1942, from the high watermark of O’Connor’s stunning successes in Compass to the demoralising low of Auchinleck and Ritchie’s calamitous withdrawal from Gazala and loss of Tobruk. In each of these chapters, Colvin lays out the tactical methods adopted by successive Allied commanders, as well as the manner in which they were influenced by such factors as educational backgrounds, competing operational theories, and personal conflicts. All served to contribute to the fluctuating capabilities of Eighth Army as it grappled with the realities of desert warfare and its own military culture—a challenge ultimately solved by the stamping of professionalism and ‘grip’ onto the desert veterans through the appointment of Bernard Montgomery. In such a tightly clustered field as the literature surrounding the North African campaign, it is often hard to recommend any new additions to the historiography. New monographs appear frequently, but Eighth Army Versus Rommel does much to stand out from the crowd and offers a new perspective on the battles in the Western Desert. There are some criticisms that can be levelled at the book, such as the author’s tendency to avoid criticising Axis forces for egregious missteps in the same manner as he does the Eighth Army, but these can be easily overlooked when considering the engaging narrative of Colvin’s work as a whole. In fact, one could argue that the greatest misstep in this monograph was the subtitle: Tactics, Training and Operations simply does not do justice to the intriguing examination of institutional culture and doctrinal development addressed in this volume. It represents a valuable and welcome addition to the field.

S AMUEL W ALLACE University of Leeds